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Abstract
The study begins with surveying the capital structure 
theories ranging from MM irrelevance to the latest 
theories. The survey mainly revolves around four 
recognized theories of capital structure; the trade-off 
theory, agency costs theory, pecking order theory, and 
market timing theory. However, the principal objectives 
of the study are to investigate the empirical evidences of 
relevant theories and identify the major determinants of 
capital structure. The survey takes place both in developed 
as well as developing countries. The results of survey 
unveil that each theory, in isolation, fails to gain consensus 
in explaining the capital structure phenomenon. Rather it 
seems that the theories, in most cases, are complimentary. 
Even though the two theories; trade-off and pecking 
order; have surely some supremacy over others, the recent 
performance of market timing theory puts other theories 
into challenge. Amid many determinants of capital 
structure, this study spots six determinants; profitability, 
assets tangibility, firm’s size, agency costs, firm’s growth, 
and market timing as significant ones. But, profitability, 
agency costs, and market timing are evidently sought to be 
superior determinants of capital structure choices. Thus, it 
appears that the capital structure conundrum still remains. 
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IntroductIon
In general, capital structure is the blending of debt and 
equity that a firm uses to finance its overall operation and 
growth. Here debt refers to usually long-term debt, but it 
may also include specific short-term debt. Preferred stocks 
and retained earnings may also be included in the capital 
structure. Capital structure is a very controversial issue in 
corporate finance (Akinyomi & Olagunju, 2013). Many 
researchers and academicians attempted to perform many 
researches with an eye to find out the answers of several 
questions regarding capital structure: Has capital structure 
any impact on firm’s performance, or is capital structure 
relevant to firm’s value, or have the financial managers 
any choices on capital structure policy? But until 1958, 
no one can address this issue suitably (Hasan et al., 2014). 
However, it gets water following “the capital structure 
irrelevance theory” as proposed by Modigliani and Miller 
(1958) (shortly called “MM theory”). Subsequent this 
proposition a wide range of theoretical and empirical 
studies have been conducted to investigate on the 
various issues of the capital structure, but these direct to 
different and often contentious results (Frentzel, 2013). 
Even with the pretty discussion, the understanding about 
how the firms make their financing choices and what 
determines corporate capital structure is still imprecise. 
It continues drawing attention of the researchers as one 
of the hot issues in finance. Accordingly, this also directs 
me to instigate this study. This is a literature survey type 
research. This study principally surveys the existing 
literatures and amasses the results of those studies. 
Subsequently, these results are compared to existing 
theories in order to justify whether these theories have any 
empirical evidence or not. 
In essence, the study is inspired from the very popular 
survey on capital structure theory by Harris and Raviv 
(1991). Albeit their study focuses on diverse aspects of 
capital structure theories, the main focus of their study 
is to find empirical evidence and relevant determinants 
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of capital structure. Accordingly, our study has some 
intuitive features. First, the survey will be investigated 
for two sub-periods: early and current periods. Then, 
the study also looks into the relevant evidence in the 
developing countries couple with developed ones. Another 
feature is that evidence will be inspected on the basis of 
favorable, unfavorable and mixed results of the relevant 
studies. Nonetheless, this study has three-fold objectives. 
First, the study will investigate the empirical evidence 
relevant to major capital structure theories. Second, it will 
provide the findings from the investigation. And finally 
the study will offer some observations if any. From the 
survey of empirical evidence, the paper unfolds that no 
theory, in isolation, can expound the capital structure issue 
suitably, which evidences the existence of capital structure 
paradox.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 
1 will diagnose the major theories of capital structure. 
Section 2 will discuss data and methodology. In section 3 
we will present the evidence relevant to theories. Finally, 
section 4 will provide conclusions and recommendation.
1 .  d I A g n o S I S  o f  t h e  c A P I tA L 
Structure theorIeS
After MM Irrelevance and relevance theories (1958 and 
1963) four recognized alternative theories: the trade-off 
theory, agency costs theory, pecking order theory, and 
market timing theory; have come up to now (Vergas et 
al., 2015). Before proceeding to weighty investigation 
about capital structure we need to overview the relevant 
theories. This section will diagnose all the major theories 
of capital structure.
1.1 The Irrelevancy Theory of Capital Structure - 
Modigliani and Miller
Prior to 1958, not a single theory got triumphant to address 
the capital structure issue aptly. In 1958, Modigliani and 
Miller proposed a theory called “irrelevance theory of 
capital structure” shortly “MM theory”. This theory is 
called most influential in finance (Weston & Brigham, 
1990). MM theory is rested on some impractical 
assumptions particularly the assumption of perfect capital 
markets. If these assumptions hold true, they prove that 
capital structure is immaterial to shareholders of a firm 
as because it does not make any impact on firm’s value. 
Hence the following situation must exist: 
VL = VU = SL + D .
Here VL is the value of a levered firm, which is equal 
to VU, the value of an identical but unlevered firm. SL is 
the value of the levered firm’s stock, and D is the value of 
its debt.
Albeit MM theory is rested on some impractical 
assumptions, this theory provides us a basis to perform 
research on capital structure. Later Modigliani and 
Miller (1963) revised their earlier theory by relaxing the 
assumption of no corporate taxes and show that the value 
of a firm increases with more debt due to the tax shield 
gained on interest payment of debt.
VL = VU + TD .
Here TD is product of corporate tax and amount of 
debt.
This implies that with a tax rate of about 45%, 
employment of every dollar of debt adds about 45 cents of 
value to the firm, and this leads to the conclusion that the 
optimal capital structure is virtually 100% debt. 
1.2  The Trade-Off Theory
The trade-off theory is an expansion of the MM theorem 
with taking consideration the effects of taxes and 
bankruptcy costs. The classical version of the hypothesis 
goes back to Kraus and Litzenberger (1973). However, 
the theory assumes that firms trade off the benefits of 
debt financing (favorable corporate tax treatment) against 
the higher interest rates and bankruptcy costs and find an 
optimal capital structure – that mixer at which firm’s value 
will be maximized. The theory also adds that profitable 
firms can borrow more up to a certain level, because after 
then the profitability and the value of the firm will reduce 
due to interaction of bankruptcy costs and agency costs. 
Certainly the trade-off theory dominates the literature on 
capital structure claims that the optimal capital structure 
can be obtained by balancing the losses and gains of debt 
(Myers, 1977). 
1.3 the Agency costs theory
Jensen and Meckling (1976) expand the M&M view 
through developing agency costs theory. They assume that 
agency problems may occur if shareholders and managers 
have different objectives. Such conflicts are particularly 
likely when the firm’s managers have too much cash at 
their disposal. Managers often use excess cash to finance 
pet projects or for perquisites that may lead to reduce 
firm’s value (Weston & Brigham, 1990). By contrast, 
managers with limited “excess cash flow” are less able to 
make such wasteful expenditures. Thus, the use of debt 
capital will minimize the agency cost since the payment 
of debt interest diminishes the surplus cash.
1.4  the Pecking order theory
In contrast to the trade-off theory, Myers and Majluf 
(1984) developed the pecking order theory which 
assumes that there is no optimal capital structure. Instead 
the theory states that firms have a preferred hierarchy 
for financing choices. The theory is based on the idea 
of asymmetric information between firm’s managers 
and investors. Asymmetric information implies that 
firm’s managers have more information about the firm’s 
operations, riskiness, and future prospects than investors 
have. In this case, it becomes tough for firm’s managers 
to persuade investors about the true value of their firm 
especially about the firm’s future prospect (Miglo, 2010). 
Therefore, it is likely that the market undervalues firm’s 
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shares as investors have less information to accurately 
value the securities issued. This makes raising new 
equity very costly (Weston & Brigham, 1990). To evade 
the underinvestment problem, managers will look for 
financing the new project using a security that is not 
undervalued by the market (Cotei & Farhat, 2009). 
Thus, Myers and Majluf (1984) propose a hierarchy 
for financing; implying that a firm first raises capital 
internally from retained earnings and selling off its short-
term marketable securities. Then, the firm will issue debt 
and preferred stock provided that the first source has been 
exhausted. Finally the firm will issue new stock only as a 
last resort. 
1.5 the Market timing theory
Lately, Baker and Wurgler (2002) have proposed a new 
theory of capital structure named “market timing theory 
of capital structure” which is based on the assumption that 
firm picks the financing source that is most cost efficient 
at the point in time fund is required. Hence, managers can 
increase current shareholder’s wealth by timing the issue 
of securities meaning that firms sell new stocks when 
the stock price is perceived to be overvalued, and buying 
back own shares of stocks when they are undervalued. 
Therefore, stock price variation is a deciding factor that 
affects firm’s capital structures decision. 
Manager first release positive information which 
reduces the asymmetry problem between the firm’s 
management and stockholders prior to issuing equity. 
Reduce in information asymmetry will increase the stock 
price (Luigi & Sorin, 2009). This implies that firms 
create their own timing opportunities to finance their 
project. 
2. dAtA And MethodoLogy
This study is a literature survey type. After diagnosing 
the different theories of capital structure, we review 
the existing empirical evidence with a view to find out 
each theory’s relative strength. Another objective of this 
study is to mark the significant determinants of capital 
structure. We also look for any new dimension regarding 
the theories that have recently been discovered. Albeit 
the study covers the literatures that published from 1958 
(following MM theory) up to September, 2016, the study 
puts special focus on recent literatures. In addition, 
the survey finds evidence in both developed as well as 
developing countries with a view of making consensus 
regarding capital structure issue. 
3. the evIdence
MM theory opened the door for researchers to conduct 
their researches on various issues of capital structure. After 
that extensive researches have been conducted to unearth 
the relationship between capital structure and firm’s 
performance in the world and the trend is still continuing. 
However, the study will search for evidence pertinent to 
four theories; the trade-off theory, agency costs theory, 
pecking order theory, and market timing theory.  
3.1 The Trade-Off Theory
Most of the initial researches on capital structure 
support the idea of an optimal capital structure i.e.; 
trade-off theory (Barclay & Smith, 2005). At the early, 
Mayers (1977), Miller (1977), Ross (1977), Leland 
and file (1977), Heinkel (1982), Blazenko (1987), 
John (1987), Dammon and Senbet (1988), Noe (1988), 
Narayanan (1988), Poitevin (1989), Ravid and Sarig 
(1989), Hirshleifer and Thakor (1989), Harris and Raviv 
(1990a), Stulz (1990), Roden and Lewellen (1995), 
Champion (1999), Ghosh et al. (2000), Fernandez (2001), 
Hovakimian (2001), and Hadlock and James (2002) find a 
significant and positive relationship between profitability 
and capital structure. This positive relationship refers 
that the more debt in the capital structure causes the 
more performance of the firm. Certainly these evidences 
support trade-off theory. 
Harris and Raviv (1991) conduct a huge survey 
on literature of capital structure studies since 1958 to 
1991. They integrate the results of these studies and 
find that leverage decreases with volatility, advertising 
expenditures, research and development expenditures, 
bankruptcy probability, profitability and uniqueness of 
the product and increases with fixed assets, non-debt tax 
shields, growth opportunities, and firm size. 
In recent, Margaritis and Psillaki (2010) evidence 
a significant positive relation between leverage and 
performance of French firms. Matemilola et al. (2011), 
Warokka et al. (2011), Samuel (2013), Aliakbar et al. 
(2013), and Nguyen and Nguyen (2015) got the same 
result in African, Malaysian, Iranian Vietnam firms 
respectively. Hasan et al. (2014) get positive relation 
between short term debt and firm’s performance as 
measured by EPS in Bangladesh.
In contrast, a rigorous study was performed by Titman 
and Wessels (1988) to find out the determinants of capital 
structure. They find negative relation between profitability 
and all types of debts. Rajan and Zingales (1995) also 
investigate the capital structure of US firms and reveal 
that there is a negative relation between profitability and 
debt-level, and the relationship would be more visible 
if the firm size is big. A number of researches support 
this relationship. For example; Kester (1986), Chang 
(1987), Friend and Lang (1988), Fama and French (1998), 
Gonedes et al. (1998), Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), 
Simerly and Li (2000), Gleason et al. (2000), Booth et 
al. (2001), Pandey (2001), and Fama and French (2002) 
confirm a significant negative relation between the debt 
and profitability in their studies. This negative relation 
between debt and profitability evidently certify against the 
trade-off theory.
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In recent studies, Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti 
(2006), Barclay et al. (2006), Frank and Goyal (2007), 
Athula et al. (2011), Nor and Fatihah (2012), Shubita and 
Alsawalhah (2012), Iavorskyi (2013), Amos and Jeremiah 
(2013), Canarella et al. (2014), Gharaibeh (2015), and 
Hamid et al. (2015) also validate the negative relation 
between the debt and profitability. 
Ramadan (2015) finds negative relationship between 
profitability and debt which is not consistent with tradeoff 
theory, but the positive relationship between firm’s size 
and leverage evidences the tradeoff theory. 
Some authors reveal mixed results. Kinsman and 
Newman (1998) investigate the relationship between 
debt level and firm’s performance and uncover that 
earnings are negatively correlated with short-term debt, 
but positively related with long-term debt. A similar result 
was found by Mesquita and Lara (2003), Abor (2005), 
Zeitun and Tian (2007), and Salim and Yadav (2012) in 
Brazil, Ghana, Jordan and Malaysia respectively. On the 
other hand, Hasan et al. (2014) expose that earnings are 
positively associated with short-term debt, but negatively 
associated with long-term debt.
Tianyu (2013) inspect the relationship between capital 
structure and firm’s performance in both developed 
(Germany & Sweden) and developing countries (China). 
He observes that capital structure tends to be negatively 
correlated with firm’s performance in developing 
countries (e.g. in China) whereas, positively correlated 
with the same in developed countries (e.g. two European 
countries). 
Alternatively, some scholars obtain weak to no 
relation; e.g. Phillips and Sipahioglu (2004) evidence that 
there is no significant relation between capital structure 
and firm’s performance in UK. Ibrahim (2009) also 
confirms the result in Egypt.
A number of authors find asset tangibility and firm’s 
size as influential factors in determining capital structure 
of a firm. A significant positive relationship between asset 
tangibility and firm’s capital structure was unearthed by 
Myers (1977, 1984), Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan 
and Zingales (1995), Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), 
and Baker and Wurgler (2002). They opine that companies 
having comparatively high level of tangible assets are less 
likely to be default and will have more ability to secure 
debts which may lead to this positive relationship. But 
studies in developing countries reveal mixed results. For 
example; Wiwattanakantang (1999) evidences a positive 
relationship between tangibility and capital structure in 
Thailand whereas negative relation is exposed by Booth 
et al. (2001) in ten developing countries and Huang and 
Song (2002) in China. 
In recent, Barclay et al. (2006), Brown and Marble 
(2007), and Harrison et al. (2010) reveal that asset 
tangibility is positively related to leverage, while 
profitability and market-to-book ratios are negatively 
related. Finally they concluded that their finding 
supports trade-off theory. Skoogh and Swärd (2015) also 
uncover positive relationship between tangibility and 
capital structure. They also added that even though their 
findings do not support any single theory uniformly, they 
identify the trade-off theory as the finest theory of capital 
structure.
The firm’s size can also be a significant determinant 
of capital structure. But the relation between capital 
structure and firm’s size can be either positive or 
negative. For example, Marsh (1982), Oliner and 
Rudebusch (1992), Hamaifer et al. (1994), Rajan and 
Zingales  (1995), Wald  (1999), Anderson and Makhija 
(1999), Booth et al. (2001), and Pandey, (2001) get 
positive relationship between them. This positive 
relationship leads to the existence of trade-off theory 
(Pandey, 2001). This positive relationship is also 
evidenced in developing countries by Wiwattanakantang 
(1999), Booth et al. (2002), Pandey (2001), and Huang 
and Song (2002). In contrast, a significant negative 
relation is unearthed by Kester (1986), Kim and 
Sorensen (1986), and Titman and Wessels (1988). Some 
researchers get mixed results. Bevan and Danbolt (2002), 
Caesar and Holmes (2003), and Esperanca et al. (2003) 
find that size is negatively related to short term debt, but 
positively related to long term debts. 
Recent studies also expose positive relationship 
between capital structure and firm’s size; such as; 
Gharaibeh (2015), Sanusi and Taha (2015), and Didier 
(2016) for instance.
Byoun (2007) reveals that although both small and 
large firms have low debt ratio, causes are different. Large 
firms prefer to finance from internal sources; e. g. retained 
earring; while small firms do not depend on internal funds 
rather rely on supplementary equity financing. Finally, 
he winds up that these findings neither evidence of the 
pecking order theory nor the tradeoff theory. Fareed et 
al. (2014) discover that debt has negative relation with 
profitability whilst positive relation with tangibility, firm 
size, and growth, which validate the static trade off theory.
3.2 the Agency costs theory
Following the agency costs theory as developed by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), a number of researchers 
conduct testing of this theory. Mixed results are detected 
in their studies. Some authors find that agency costs can 
be trimmed down by the use of more debt in the capital 
structure; i.e. supporting agency cost theory. At the early, 
Grossman and Hart (1982), Jensen (1986), Williams 
(1987), Rajan and Winton (1995), Agrawal and knoeber 
(1996), Stulz  (2000), Ang et al. (2000), Berger and Patti 
(2002), Li and Cui (2003), and Florackis and Ozkan (2004) 
evidence negative relation between debt and agency cost 
and accordingly support the agency cost theory. 
In line with early studies, recent studies conducted 
by Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006), Margaritis and 
Psillaki (2007), Zhang and LI (2008), McKnight and Weir 
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(2009), Xiao (2009), Pratheepkanth (2011), Chang et al. 
(2012), Gul et al. (2012), Siddiqui et al. (2013), Kokoreva 
and Ulugova (2013), Rakesh and Lakshmi (2013), 
Mohammed (2013), and Zheng (2013) also demonstrate 
negative relationship between debt and agency cost. In 
contrary, Onsomu (2013) and Chechet and Olayiwola 
(2014) found positive relation between leverage and the 
agency cost which evidence against agency cost theory. 
Likewise, Brounen et al. (2006) conduct an inspection 
regarding managers in European countries and reveal 
no relation between capital   structure and agency costs. 
Therefore, the role of debt in diminishing agency costs 
has no consensus (Florackis & Ozkan, 2004). 
Agency cost theory is also evidenced in Developing 
countries; e.g. Bundala (2012) in Tanzania et al. (2013) in 
India, and Umer (2014) in Ethiopia.
Rajan and Winton (1995) and Stulz (2000) demonstrate 
that short term debt can be a useful tool to control 
management, which will direct to check agency costs. 
Kim and Sorensen (1986) and Titman and Wessels 
(1988) reveal that growing firms tend to have high agency 
costs and therefore firm’s growth and financial leverage is 
expected to be inversely related. This negative relation is 
also expounded by Rajan and Zingales (1995), De Miguel 
and Pindado (2001), Chen and Jiang (2001), Bevan and 
Danbolt (2001), Drobetz and Fix (2003), Nguyen and 
Neelakantan (2006), Cheng and Green (2008), and Green 
and Murinde (2008). On the other hand, positive relation 
between leverage and firm’s growth is revealed by Chang 
and Rhee (1990), Banerjee et al. (2000), Fattouh et al. 
(2002), Schargrodsky (2002), and Singh and Davidson 
(2003).
Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006) test agency 
cost theory through making link between leverage and 
firm performance of U.S. banking industry. They find 
that leverage is positively connected with the firm 
performance which justifies the agency cost theory. Using 
the same methodology Margaritis and Psillaki (2007) also 
support the agency cost theory.
3.3  the Pecking order theory
Subsequent the development of pecking order theory by 
Myers and Majluf (1984), many researchers investigate 
to test this theory and evidence in favor of the pecking 
order theory. At the beginning, Krasker (1986), Narayanan 
(1988), Noe (1988), Constantinides and Grundy (1989), 
Baskin (1989), Wilbricht (1989), Cadsby et al. (1990), 
Dybvig and Zender (1991), Claggett (1991), Jensen et al. 
(1992), Persons (1994), Vogt (1994), Jung et al. (1996), 
Cadsby et al. (1998), Shyam-Sunder  and  Myers (1999), 
Fulghieri and Lukin (2001), Pandey (2001), Watson and 
Wilson (2002), Lemmon  and  Zender  (2004), Xueping 
Wu et al (2004), Zhao et al. (2004), and Ghosh and Cai 
(2004), all confirm this theory. 
Recent studies also get evidence in favor of this theory. 
For example; Gaud et al. (2005), Leary and Roberts (2005), 
Akhtar and Oliver (2006), Beattie et al. (2006), Brounen 
et al. (2006), Aggarwal and Zong (2006), Raj Aggarwal et 
al (2006), Ursel (2007), Cole (2008), Jong et al. (2009), 
Karadeniz et al (2009), Ahmed et al. (2009), Bharath et 
al. (2009), De Jong et al. (2011), Tucker and Stoja (2011), 
Rödel (2013), Canarella et al. (2014), Hasan et al. (2014), 
and Laisi (2016). They all find the validity of pecking 
order in their studies.
This theory is successfully tested in developing 
countries too; such as; Booth et al. (2001) in 10 
developing countries, Pandey (2001) in Malaysia, Tong 
and Green (2007) in China, Ahmed et al. (2009) in 
Malaysia, Saarani and Shahadan (2013) in Malaysia, 
Hasan et al. (2014) in Bangladesh, Koksal and Orman 
(2014) in Turkey, Acaravci (2015) in Turkey, Jantarakolica 
and Sakayachiwakit (2015) in Thailand, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Philippines, and Bhama et al. (2016) in 
India.
However, some studies investigated by Helwege and 
Liang (1996), Seifert and Gonenc (2008), Leary and 
Roberts (2008), Machielsen (2013), and Khan and Adom 
(2015) notice very little evidence for the pecking order 
theory.
In contrary, many researchers reveal no evidence 
in favor of the pecking order theory. For example, 
Jalilvand and Harris (1984), Auerbach (1985), Long and 
Malitz (1985), Brennan and Kraus (1987), Noe (1988), 
Constantinides and Grundy (1989), Smith and Watts 
(1992), Opler and Titman (1994), Helwege and Liang 
(1996), Vilasuso and Minkler 2001, Fama and French 
(2002), and Frank and Goyal (2003). They all disagree with 
the behavior of pecking order theory in their respective 
studies. Latest studies as examined by Fama and French 
(2005), Gaud et al. (2007), Seifert and Gonenc (2008), 
Harrison et al. (2010), and Vasiliou and Daskalakis (2009) 
also refute the pecking order theory.  
Based on their empirical results, Gaud et al. (2005), 
Ghosh and Cai (2004), and Tucker and Stoja (2011), all 
suggest for both trade-off and pecking order theories, 
whereas Graham and Harvey (2001), Prasad et al. (2001), 
and Fama and French (2002) substantiate assorted and 
vague results regarding to this theory.
3.4  the Market timing theory
Prior to market timing theory of Baker and Wurgler 
(2002), a number of studies informally identify this 
market timing as an explanatory factor in capital 
structure choices. For example, Taggart (1977), Marsh 
(1982), Jalilvand and Harris (1984), Asquith and Mullins 
(1986), Korajczyk et al. (1991), Choe, et al. (1993), 
Rajan and Zingales (1995), Bayless and Chaplinsky 
(1996), Pagano et al. (1998), Hovakimian et al. (2001), 
and Graham and Harvey (2001). They all examine 
the firm’s timing manner indirectly and majority 
studies discover the validation of equity market timing 
(Kaya, 2007). However, the market timing theory gets 
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recognition following the theory of Baker and Wurgler 
(2002). 
At the early, Korajczyk and Levy (2002), Huang and 
Ritter (2004), Flannery and Rangan (2004), Hovakimian 
et al. (2004), Elliott et al. (2004b), Chang et al. (2006), 
O’Brien, et al. (2007), Mahajan and Tartaroglu (2008), 
Harrison et al. (2010), Kim and Weisbach (2008), and 
Vasiliou and Daskalakis (2009) examine the firm’s 
market timing behavior and their findings are consistent 
with Baker and Wurgler (2002) theory. Some studies 
uncover the existence of market timing effect on capital 
structure decision, even though this effect is momentary. 
For instance, Roberts and Leary (2005), Alti (2006), 
Hovakimian (2006), Flannery and Rangan (2006), Kaya 
(2007), and Kayhan and Titman (2007), they all agree 
with the equity market timing, but they suggest that the 
influence of market timing on capital structure decision is 
provisional. 
Current studies as conducted by Guney and Iqbal-
Hussain (2010), Alti and Sulaeman (2012),  Arosa et al. 
(2012), Gomes and Phillips (2012), Canarella et al. (2014), 
Dani et al. (2016), and Kim et al. (2016)  also corroborate 
the market timing theory. In addition, this market timing 
behavior is also exposed in developing countries; such as; 
Ni et al. (2009) in china, Chichti and Bougatef (2010) in 
Tunisia, Setyawan and Frensidy (2013) in Indonesia, and 
Khanna et al. (2014) in India.  
Conversely, several studies find no strong evidence 
in support of the market timing theory. For example, Alti 
(2003), Bie and Haan (2004), Leary and Robert (2005), 
Chen and Zhao (2005), Mahajan and Tartaroglu (2008), 
Brendea (2012), Çelik and Akarim (2013), Russel and 
Hung (2013), Dierker et al. (2015), Kargar et al. (2015), 
and Shumilovskaya (2016). They stumble on either very 
little and inconsistent or no evidence of market timing 
behavior in their respective studies. 
On the other hand, the findings of Hovakimian et al. 
(2014), and Kim et al. (2016) evidence for both pecking 
order and market timing theories.
concLuSIon
From the above the survey analysis, it seems that the 
puzzle of capital structure still remains. It also appears 
obvious that a single theory cannot explain capital 
structure phenomenon completely, since all the four 
theories have both favorable and unfavorable evidences. 
Rather the theories, in most cases, are complimentary 
(Harris & Raviv, 1991). But, the two theories; trade-
off and pecking order; have surely some preeminence 
over others. However, the results of the above analysis 
are summarized in the below Tables 1 to 10. The first 
four tables present the results of the empirical evidences 
of the four theories and the rest of the six tables show 
the empirical evidences of the determinants of capital 
structure choices. The survey uncovers that different 
studies conducted in different countries and even in the 
same county regarding the same issue of capital structure 
exhibit different results. These studies, therefore, fail to 
revive a consensus on capital structure theories. 
Table 1
Results of Empirical Evidence of Trade-Off Theory of Capital Structure
Name of the 
theories Empirical results References
Trade-off theory
Favorable
Early Studies: Mayers (1977, 1984), Miller (1977), Ross (1977), Leland & ﬁle (1977), Marsh 
(1982), Heinkel (1982), Blazenko (1987), John (1987), Dammon & Senbet (1988), Noe (1988), 
Narayanan  (1988), Poitevin (1989), Ravid and Sarig (1989), Hirshleifer & Thakor  (1989), 
Harris & Raviv (1990a), Stulz  (1990), Oliner & Rudebusch (1992), Hamaifer et  al. (1994), 
Roden & Lewellen (1995), Champion (1999), Wiwattanakantang (1999), Wald  (1999), 
Anderson & Makhija (1999), Ghosh et al. (2000), Fernandez (2001), Hovakimian (2001), 
Hadlock & James (2002), Brown & Marble (2007), Harrison et al. (2010), Margaritis & 
Psillaki (2010), Matemilola et al. (2011), Warokka et al. (2011), Samuel (2013), Aliakbar et 
al. (2013), Skoogh & Swärd (2015), Nguyen & Nguyen (2015), Gharaibeh (2015), Sanusi and 
Taha (2015), Didier (2016) .
Unfavorable
Kester (1986), Kim and Sorensen (1986), Chang (1987), Friend & Lang (1988), Fama & 
French (1998) Gonedes et al. (1998), Simerly & Li (2000), Gleason et al. (2000), Fama & 
French (2002), Berger & Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006), Byoun (2007), Frank & Goyal (2007), 
Athula et al. (2011), Nor & Fatihah (2012), Shubita & Alsawalhah (2012), Iavorskyi (2013), 
Amos & Jeremiah (2013), Canarella et al. (2014),  Gharaibeh (2015), Hamid et al. (2015) 
Mixed
Titman & Wessels (1988), Rajan & Zingales (1995), Kinsman & Newman (1998), Shyam-
Sunder & Myers (1999), Pandey (2001),  Booth et al. (2001), Bevan & Danbolt (2002), Caesar 
& Holmes (2003), Esperanca et al. (2003), Mesquita & Lara (2003), Abor (2005), Barclay 
et al. (2006), Zeitun & Tian (2007), Salim & Yadav (2012), Fareed et al. (2014), Hasan et al. 
(2014), Ramadan (2015) 
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Table 2
Results of Empirical Evidence of Agency Theory of Capital Structure
Name of the 
theories
Empirical 
results References
Agency  cos t s 
theory
Favorable
Grossman & Hart (1982), Jensen (1986), Kim & Sorensen (1986), Williams (1987), Titman & 
Wessels (1988), Rajan & Winton (1995), Rajan & Zingales (1995), Agrawal & knoeber (1996), 
Stulz (2000), Ang et al. (2000), De Miguel & Pindado (2001), Chen and Jiang (2001), Bevan & 
Danbolt (2001), Berger & Patti (2002), Li & Cui (2003), Florackis and Ozkan (2004), Berger & 
Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006), Margaritis & Psillaki (2007), Zhang and LI (2008), McKnight & Weir 
(2009), Xiao (2009), Pratheepkanth (2011), Chang et al. (2012), Gul et al. (2012), Bundala (2012), 
Tanzania et al. (2013), Siddiqui et al. (2013), Kokoreva & Ulugova (2013), Lakshmi (2013), 
Mohammed (2013), Zheng (2013), Umer (2014) 
Unfavorable
Chang & Rhee (1990), Banerjee et al. (2000), Fattouh et al. (2002), Schargrodsky (2002), Sign and 
Davidson (2003), Onsomu (2013), Chechet & Olayiwola (2014), Brounen et al. (2006), Florackis 
& Ozkan (2004), 
Mixed  
Table 3
Results of Empirical Evidence of Pecking Order Theory of Capital Structure
Name of the 
theories
Empirical 
results References
Pecking order theory
Favorable
Krasker (1986), Narayanan (1988), Noe (1988), Constantinides & Grundy (1989), Baskin 
(1989), Wilbricht (1989), Cadsby et al. (1990), Dybvig & Zender (1991), Claggett (1991), 
Jensen et al. (1992), Persons (1994), Vogt (1994), Jung et al. (1996), Cadsby et al. (1998), 
Shyam-Sunder & Myers (1999), Fulghieri & Lukin (2001), Booth et al. (2001), Pandey 
(2001), Watson & Wilson (2002), Lemmon & Zender  (2004), Wu et al (2004), Zhao 
et al. (2004), Ghosh & Cai (2004), Gaud et al. (2005), Leary & Roberts (2005), Akhtar 
&  Oliver (2006), Beattie et al. (2006), Brounen et al. (2006), Aggarwal & Zong (2006), 
Raj Aggarwal et al. (2006), Ursel (2007), Tong & Green (2007), Cole (2008), Jong et al. 
(2009), Karadeniz et al. (2009), Ahmed et al. (2009), Bharath et al. (2009), De Jong et al. 
(2011), Tucker & Stoja (2011), Rödel (2013), Saarani & Shahadan (2013), Canarella et al. 
(2014), Koksal & Orman (2014), Hasan et al. (2014), Acaravci (2015), Jantarakolica & 
Sakayachiwakit (2015),  Bhama et al. (2016), Laisi (2016).
Unfavorable
Jalilvand & Harris (1984), Auerbach (1985), Long & Malitz (1985), Brennan & Kraus 
(1987), Noe (1988), Constantinides & Grundy (1989), Smith & Watts (1992), Opler & 
Titman (1994), Helwege & Liang (1996), Vilasuso & Minkler 2001, Fama & French (2002), 
Frank & Goyal (2003), Fama & French (2005), Gaud et al. (2007), Seifert & Gonenc (2008), 
Harrison et al. (2010), Vasiliou & Daskalakis (2009).  
Mixed Graham & Harvey (2001), Prasad et al. (2001),  Fama & French (2002), Gaud et al. (2005), Ghosh & Cai (2004), Tucker & Stoja (2011). 
Table 4
Results of Empirical Evidence of Market Timing Theory of Capital Structure
Name of the theories Empirical results References
Market timing theory
Favorable
Korajczyk & Levy (2002), Huang & Ritter (2004), Flannery & Rangan (2004), 
Hovakimian et al. (2004), Elliott et al. (2004b), Roberts & Leary (2005), Alti (2006) 
& Hovakimian (2006), Chang et al. (2006), Flannery & Rangan (2006), Kaya (2007), 
Kayhan & Titman (2007), O’Brien, et al. (2007),  Mahajan & Tartaroglu (2008), 
Harrison et al. (2010), Kim & Weisbach (2008), Vasiliou & Daskalakis (2009), 
Ni et al. (2009), Guney & Iqbal-Hussain (2010), Chichti & Bougatef (2010), Alti 
& Sulaeman (2012),  Arosa et al. (2012), Gomes & Phillips (2012), Setyawan & 
Frensidy (2013), Khanna et al. (2014), Canarella et al. (2014), Dani et al. (2016), 
Kim et al. (2016).  
Unfavorable
Alti (2003), Bie & Haan (2004), Leary & Robert (2005), Chen & Zhao (2005), 
Mahajan & Tartaroglu (2008), Brendea (2012), Çelik & Akarim (2013), Russel & 
Hung (2013), Dierker et al. (2015), Kargar et al. (2015), Shumilovskaya (2016). 
Mixed Hovakimian et al. (2014), Kim et al. (2016).
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Table 5
Empirical Evidence of the Association Between Profitability and Debts
Determinants Relationship with debt References
Proﬁtability
Positive relation with debt
Mayers (1977), Miller (1977), Ross (1977), Leland & file (1977), 
Heinkel (1982), Blazenko (1987), John (1987), Dammon & Senbet 
(1988), Noe (1988), Narayanan  (1988), Poitevin (1989), Ravid & 
Sarig (1989), Hirshleifer & Thakor  (1989), Harris & Raviv (1990a), 
Stulz (1990), Roden & Lewellen (1995), Champion (1999), Ghosh 
et al. (2000), Fernandez (2001), Hovakimian (2001), Hadlock 
& James (2002), Margaritis & Psillaki (2010), Matemilola et al. 
(2011), Warokka et al. (2011), Samuel (2013), Aliakbar et al. (2013), 
Nguyen & Nguyen (2015). 
Negative relation with debt
Titman & Wessels (1988), Rajan & Zingales (1995), Kester (1986), 
Chang (1987), Friend & Lang (1988), Fama & French (1998) 
Gonedes et al. (1998), Shyam-Sunder & Myers (1999), Simerly 
& Li (2000), Gleason et al. (2000), Booth et al. (2001), Pandey 
(2001), Fama & French (2002), Berger & Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006), 
Barclay et al. (2006), Frank & Goyal (2007), Athula et al. (2011), 
Nor & Fatihah (2012), Shubita & Alsawalhah (2012), Iavorskyi 
(2013), Amos & Jeremiah (2013), Canarella et al. (2014), Gharaibeh 
(2015), Hamid et al. (2015), Ramadan (2015). 
Mixed results
Kinsman & Newman (1998), Mesquita & Lara (2003), Abor (2005), 
Zeitun & Tian (2007), Salim & Yadav (2012), Tianyu (2013), Hasan 
et al. (2014),
No relation Phillips & Sipahioglu (2004), Ibrahim (2009). 
Table 6
Empirical Evidence of the Association Between Tangibility and Debts
Determinants Relationship with debt References
Tangibility
Positive relation with debt
Myers (1977, 1984), Titman & Wessels (1988), Rajan & Zingales 
(1995), Shyam-Sunder & Myers (1999), Wiwattanakantang (1999), 
Baker & Wurgler (2002), (2006), Brown & Marble (2007), Harrison 
et al. (2010), Skoogh & Swärd (2015).
Negative relation with debt Booth et al. (2001), Huang & Song (2002).
Mixed results  
No relation  
Table 7
Empirical Evidence of the Association Between Firm’s Size and Debts
Determinant Relationship with debt References
Firm’s size
Positive relation with debt
Marsh (1982), Oliner & Rudebusch (1992), Hamaifer et al. (1994), 
Rajan & Zingales  (1995), Wald  (1999), Anderson & Makhija (1999), 
Wiwattanakantang (1999), Booth et al. (2001), Pandey, (2001), 
Huang & Song (2002), Fareed et al. (2014), Gharaibeh (2015), 
Sanusi & Taha (2015), Didier (2016).
Negative relation with debt Kester (1986), Kim & Sorensen (1986), Titman & Wessels (1988).  
Mixed results Bevan & Danbolt (2002), Caesar & Holmes (2003), Esperanca et al. (2003).
No relation  
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Table 8
Empirical Evidence of the Association Between Agency Cost and Debts
Determinant Relationship with debt References
Agency cost
Positive relation with debt Onsomu (2013), Chechet & Olayiwola (2014).
Negative relation with debt
Grossman & Hart (1982), Jensen (1986), Williams (1987), Rajan & 
Winton (1995), Agrawal & knoeber (1996), Stulz  (2000), Ang et al. 
(2000), Berger & Patti (2002), Li & Cui (2003), Florackis & Ozkan 
(2004), Berger & Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006), Margaritis & Psillaki 
(2007), Zhang & LI (2008), McKnight & Weir (2009), Xiao (2009), 
Pratheepkanth (2011), Chang et al. (2012), Gul et al. (2012), Bundala 
(2012), Siddiqui et al. (2013), Kokoreva & Ulugova (2013), Lakshmi 
(2013), Mohammed (2013), Zheng (2013), Tanzania et al. (2013), 
Umer (2014).
Mixed results  
No relation Florackis & Ozkan (2004), Brounen et al. (2006). 
Table 9
Empirical Evidence of the Association Between Firm’s Growth and Debts
Determinant Relationship with debt References
Firm’s growth
Positive relation with debt Chang & Rhee (1990), Banerjee et al. (2000), Fattouh et al. (2002), Schargrodsky (2002), Sign & Davidson (2003).
Negative relation with debt
Kim & Sorensen (1986), Titman & Wessels (1988), Rajan & Zingales (1995), De 
Miguel & Pindado (2001), Chen & Jiang (2001), Bevan & Danbolt (2001), Drobetz & 
Fix (2003), Nguyen & Neelakantan (2006), Cheng & Green (2008), Green & Murinde 
(2008).
Mixed results  
No relation  
Table 10
Empirical Evidence of the Association between Market Timing and Debts
Determinant Relationship with capital structure choice References
Market timing
Market timing has significant effect on 
capital structure choice
Korajczyk & Levy (2002), Huang & Ritter (2004), Flannery & Rangan 
(2004), Hovakimian et al. (2004), Elliott et al. (2004b), Chang et al. 
(2006), O’Brien et al. (2007), Mahajan & Tartaroglu (2008), Harrison 
et al. (2010), Kim & Weisbach (2008), Vasiliou & Daskalakis (2009), 
Ni et al. (2009), Chichti & Bougatef (2010), Guney & Iqbal-Hussain 
(2010), Alti & Sulaeman (2012),  Arosa et al. (2012), Gomes & 
Phillips (2012), Setyawan & Frensidy (2013), Khanna et al. (2014), 
Canarella et al. (2014), Dani et al. (2016), Kim et al. (2016).  
Market timing has significant effect on 
capital structure, but for temporary
Roberts & Leary (2005), Alti (2006), Hovakimian (2006), Flannery & 
Rangan (2006), Kaya (2007), Kayhan & Titman (2007).
Market timing has either little or no effect on 
capital structure
Alti (2003), Bie & Haan (2004), Leary & Robert (2005), Chen & 
Zhao (2005), Mahajan & Tartaroglu (2008), Brendea (2012), Çelik & 
Akarim (2013), Russel & Hung (2013), Dierker et al. (2015), Kargar et 
al. (2015), Shumilovskaya (2016). 
Albeit the capital structure decision can be influenced 
by many variables, this study identifies six significant 
variables; profitability, assets tangibility, firm’s size, 
agency costs, firm’s growth, and market timing; which are 
corroborated by most of the researchers (see also Table 5 
to 10). But profitability, agency costs, and market timing 
have certainly been appeared to be the most commanding 
determinants of capital structure choices. However, this 
study discovers some observations which are documented 
below: 
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●  No significant difference in results between 
early and recent studies on capital structure is 
found in this survey. In addition, both developed 
and developing countries produce the same 
results.
●  It seems that negative relationship between 
debt and profitability is mainly evidenced in 
developing countries as the markets in those 
countries are generally inefficient. But this study 
demonstrates that this negative relationship is 
sufficiently evidenced in developed countries 
too. Moreover, a numerous studies in developing 
countries reveal positive relationship between 
debt and profitability.
●  Firm’s profitability is positively associated with 
its long-term debt, but negatively connected with 
short-term debt.
●  Size, along with profitability, has recently 
emerged as one of the influential determinants of 
capital structure.
●  In recent, the market timing theory supposedly 
throws a challenge to other influential theories of 
capital structure (see also Table 10). 
It seems clear from the above the discussion that 
owing to its enduring paradox, the capital structure 
issue is still being accepted by the researchers as one 
of the sizzling issues of finance. However, this paper 
has some limitations too. This paper could check more 
aspects of capital structure; such as; survey could be 
conducted on the basis of developed, emerging, and 
developing countries, survey on determinants could be 
more significantly focused, and the survey period could 
be divided into three sub-periods; early, mid, and latest 
periods. Later, Researchers are suggested to take care of 
these aspects.
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